fort monroe

TURKEY

For Official Use Only

7 th Annual OPFOR Conference

Russia

Georgia

iiyazan

CAUCA S U S

Vanadzor

MOUNTAINS

Aragats
Lerr 4090 m
(13,419 ft)

a£euir

Sumgayrt

Azerbaijan

Nogarno ■
Karabakh

CAUCASIA

Qarasu

Nagorno-

Karabakh

disputed)

_

Agdan

Xar k andi ;

AM Bayraml

Turkey

Salyan

Dogubayazit

HAXgiVAH

HaxQiuan

Kapan

karan

Mara

Commander,
HQs U.slArmy
TRADOC

Repu

An

blicof 1
ifar |

Caspian Overview, 2 April 2002

For Official Use Only

Contents

Scenario Overview

Operational Environment

Situation

* Weather/Terrain/Environmentals

* Friendly Situation (Anfar)

Current Situation
Anfar Forces
Anfar Systems

Anfar Disposition

* Road To War

Current Dispositions

Environment

The Caspian: ripe for conflict - critically important -

’okhatauri-

Tbilisi!

Kobuletij

PeronitBurnu

r.mfrj/i

Shuraabat

Absheron

Pipeline

^hilmebO

rimanabad
in War an

QalwD3gh

naif

AMar;

Karabakh (N-K)

Wm

i

Rasht*

presents a complex full spectrum dilemma for use in force design and determining system

capabilities

The Strategic Setting

> Regional conflict with strategic consequence....

> Get It Right = Economic/Political/Military
stability

> Get It Wrong = Potentially Spins out of control

> Competition for scarce, valuable resources... Oil,

Gas...

> Ethnic rivalry....Anfar vs. Azerbaijani vs. Iranian vs....

> Religious animosity.. .Christian vs. Moslem. ..Suni and

Qh i H-o

ash ~ Operational Battlespace

> Sizable AOR with varied geography ^ Ongoing insurgency
^fld weather / diverse terrain

> Austere and deteriorating
infrastructure

> Fractured Publi§)»^jJfl£ions

> Significant NGO/IO Presence with .
5 million displaced persons

international and Media Interest

>Thinking, adaptive - - fully understands his battlespace and, his enemyj
> Will: exploit perceived vulnerabilities and leverage available technologi

> Deny, limit, interrupt, or delay US entry - allow no sanctuary - employing all

> Shield by deliberate actions to counter C4ISR and neutralize air & missile fo

Operational Dilemma

> Anfar invades to seize and regain lost territory, control resources and force
implosion

> Azeri Government - in danger of collapse; military weakened, insurgency
threatening

£

V a r _ __ a n ! i ! j _

r _ —i— a a

CASPIAN PLAYERS:
INTERESTS AND POSITIONS

Russia

* Substantial modern
military- forces not
available

* Desires stability in
region -

continued oil flow

* Does not support
sustained

Republic of Anfar

* Aggressor- Seeks to
incorporate N-K into Greater
Anfar

* Received military support
from Russia and Iran

* Substantial military
capability

Georgia

* Substantial conventional military-
forces not available

* Seeks to avoid major military
conflict on Georgian territory

* Wants to maintain independence
from Russia

* Wants to expand role as transit
country for oil and gas

Turkey

* Substantial conventional
military- forces not available

* Desires regional stability

* Seeks to limit Iran's power
in region

Azerbaijan

* Historic Ties to Turkey and
Iran

* Weak Conventional Military

* Seek unconditional return of
occupied territory

* Unstable political
environment

CASPIA l * Austere Infrastructure

, i • Rich in Natural Gas and Oil

Nagorno-KaranaKn (im-iCT

* Self-Proclaimed
Independent Republic (1992)

* Seeks unification with
Anfar

TC Pip<

Supports Anfar, Poised to exploit situation
Substantial modern military forces avgilabli
Large Azeri minority
Views Azerbaijan as rival for oil/gas
Seek increased long-term influence

AN FAR

GEORGIA

Yerevan

Stepanakert

NAKHICHEVAN

(Azer.)

AZERBA JAN

TURKEY

• Supported by Russia and Iran
militarily/economically

• Modern military - Well trained and
equipped

• Niche Technology prevalent
throughout systems
•One OSC in Nagorno-Karabakh

• Insufficient natural resources for food
and water

• Energy reserves under development

4000m +
aooom +
2000m +
isoom +
1000m +

500m +
om +

Communications

TransAsia-Europe fiber-optic cable through Ira
Microwave radio relay and landline through M
By satellite to the rest of the world
• Satellite earth stations - 1 Intelsat

L n ri ■/

.ismallfcy

Uy-a i*

Nabiigalj 1

5if*nbay

■i-su-^^hr

■ 1.*- -

j a * ■-'Ht(-i*-Iir5-s I*-

-LaihcgnBa^r-

ijmv

DIFFICULT

ENVIRONMENT

Terrain

* Complex, Mountainous and Lowlands

* Southeast dominated by Kura Lowlands

* North and West Dominated by Caucasus Mountains

Weather

• Cold (19-33

Degrees F)

* Icing and

Turbulence

* Clouds/Fog

REPUBLIC OF
AN FAR

Communications

* Fixed telephones in
Baku

* Cell phone coverage
in some areas

* Frail government in immediate danger of collapse

* Standing Military of 67,000; did not keep pace with region.

* Increasingly militant Shia Muslim Insurgencies

* Over 20,000 US Oil Workers in/around Baku

* Deteriorating infrastructure: roads, rails, airports

* Large number of N-K IDPs

* Baku overcrowded/largely impoverished

* Internal coup in 1999

CLIMATOLOGICAL SUMMARY -

CAUCASUS

- Best Weather Season: Summer

- Weather significantly worsens in October; improves in
March

- Worst Weather Season: Winter (January is worst of the
worst)

-CAUCASUS: Two Triangular depressions in Georgia and
Azerbaijan between Black and Caspian Seas divided by
Surnam Mountains.

-Georgia: Cloudy/Rainy in winter in flow from Black Sea.
Warmest winters in European Russia. Mountains to NE
block frigid air associated with Siberian High

- Azerbaijan: Mild Dry Winters but more variable than
Western Trans-Caucasus. Much of region is below
mean sea-level but terrain slopes up to west (near
Tblisi)

Azerbaijan - JANUARY

- Ceilings: < 2000 ft AGL occur 40% of time; < 1000 ft AGL occur
20% of time; < 200 ft AGL 7% of time (Worse around sunrise;
worse in foothills)

-Visibility: < 3200m 20% of time in fog; Worse along foothills of
eastern Caucuses than Caspian Coast. Snow may drop vsby below
3200m.

- Winds: in lowlands from SE. Farther inland winds are from NW at
10-25 kt

- Precipitation: Rain/Snow mix or Snow 7-8 days this month. Snow
uncommon in lowlands, common in higher terrain (Total liquid
equivalent: ~1")

- Temperatures: Mostly at/above freezing, but more freeze/thaw

cycles than in west. Colder in highlands. Higher winds here cause
wind-chills < 32F more than 60% of time; <0 F about 15% of the
time (Worse in hills/highlands)

- Trafficability: On and Off road - GO; Marginal in uplands
(ice/snow/fog)

- Aircraft Hazards: Mdt/Svr Turbulence common esp. near hills;

MHt/Cur Irinn rnmmnn mif h annrnarh nf frnntal cwctomc

WEATHER EFFECTS
ON MILITARY SYSTEMS

D J

F

REASON

20-30' Seas in North Atlantic

APOEs IFR; Few Indigenous Navaids; In theater Lift (seldom VFR);
Surface mobility

Icing / Turbulence; Cloud/Fog/Contaminants degrade Vis / EO sensors

Coal/Wood heating / Low sun angle enhance cloud / Fog formation &
Persistence

Cold Injuries - Anfar (Avg: 19°F to 33°F in Jan); Loss of
dexterity/mobility

Targeting sensors degraded; Lubricants thicken; On and Off road
mobility

Targeting sensors degraded; Lubricants thicken; On and Off road
mobility

GLIDs degraded by low cloud / fog; Lubricants thicken; On and Off-road
mobility

Wind damage & Snow / Ice attenuation on antennas

Frozen ground (Anfar); Saturated Ground in Azerbaijan

Persistent in lowlands - cold/calm/stable air; (May be too cold for BIO)

Wind damage to antennas; Snow/ice attenuation on antennas

Icing and Turbulence; Cloud/Fog/Contaminants degrade Vis/EO sensors;
□ MISSIONS IMPACTED Ofi^lME ! MISSIONS IMPACTED >50% OF TIME

SEA TRANS □ □
AIR TRANS □ |
UAV ■ ■
STRAT EO □ □
DISMOUNT OPS □ □
MOUNTED OPS ■ ■
ARMOR| ■

arty! !

RADARS □ □
ENGINEER □ □
CHEM □ □
SIGNAL □ □
SCOUT / ATK HELOS □ !

LIFT HELOS □ !
LOW CAS □ !
HIGH CAS ! !

Icing and Turbulence; Few Indigenous Navaids for In-theater Lift (no
VFR)

DISTRIBUTION

Caucasian

Peoples

Abkhaz
i '/Qy Abkhaz

Circassian

2

.1

i

A Adygey
Cherkess
Kabardin

Geo rgian
5 1 ' ] G Georgian

ft

7

8
»

ID

I!

II

13

Oagestani
Agul
Avar
D Dargin

1 / Lak
L Lezgin
Rutul

Tabasaran

Tsakhur

Veinakh

Chechen

Ingush

Other

r*ufur

Gssetfa

Dagestan

South

Kutaisi

G e o r g i a-

Tbilisi

Anfar

.Yerevan

WfuhttUt

Naxcrvan

IMax civ an e
Nakhichevan'),

Sokhumi

Abkhazia yC

V

■:

Indo-European
Peopl es

Armenian
iff la Armenian

Greek

Greek

Iranian
K Kurd
O Ossetian
Talysh

Slavic

z\ [ R Russian

Altaic Peoples

Turkic
Z Azeri
Balkar
Ksrachay
Kumyk
Nogay
T Turkmen

Mongol

2* □ Kalmyk

Republic, oblast, or kray boundary

1 DO KilnmeCers

73d 538 (R00397) 1

0

100 Miles

Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas are shown in white,

7 ^

TE I UCI

GEORGIA

RUSSIA

A05TAF* 1

lAZr-H

tfrovuz

O ciaiija

E HEf-1 M R

A

OCiUZ

Li.-. En. LA
ACiD^EH

IEMAYILLI

A* I

^UJAR

JAN

WJRDAhllR

o O

A.ClJLU

E HAMA HI

o

H - JKiAEUL

TURKEY

FAMU

Azeri -popLiated territories tint Republic of Armenia
is not willing to evacuate under the pretext of
creating a corridor between the Republic of Armenia
a nd Na go mo - Ka in bn kh re gio n of th e Aze rba ij a n .

Lac hi n region - 1835 sq.km.

(Population - 59.500 Azerbaijan ana)

Sluts ha region - 970 sq.km.

(Population - 29,500 Azerbaijan ans)

total: - 2805 sq.km.

(Population - 39,000 Azerbaijanians)

Total a rea of the territories of the Azeibaija n
Republic occupied by aimed forces of Republic of
Armenia since the beginning of aggression and
which undergone ethnic cleansing (popdation - 837
tho usa nd ) - 1 41 67 sq . km

0 Ref u gee c a m ps a nd plac es of s ettl e m ent
^ T ent c a m p

JJMGAIT

BAKU

Territories of Nagorno-Karabakh
region of the Azerbaijan Republic for
which the Republic of Armenia
demands the statLts of i nternational
legal pait ? ' (4383 sq.km)

Az eii - po p Lilat ed t erii to li es wti c h th e
Republic of Armenia could evacuate
onco nditio n tha t Na go mo - Ka m ba kh
region of the Azerbaijan Republic is
given the status of i nternational legal
parts 1 .

Kel baja r re gio n - 1 936 sq . km .

Rzuli region - 1386 sq.km

Oubatli regon - 302 sq.km

Jab mi I regon - 1059 sq.km

Zangdan region - 707 sq.km

Agdam region - 1093 sq.km

total :

- 6983 sq.km

ROUTES

- - Prop ose<f oi [ pipe I rrw.

— Tanker route
<,L^ Oil and gas expert

routes

/!■> ; n |,, fV , i Y*i «■- ,■

Oil concession
j| Oil field
A

0 rni

300

_l

0 km

300

Azerbaijan Transportation

Railways:

total: 2,125 km in common carrier service; does not
include industrial lines

broad gauge: 2,125 km 1.520-m gauge (1,278 km
electrified) (1993)

Highways:
total: 24,981 km
paved: 23,057 km
unpaved: 1,924 km (1998 est.)

Pipelines: crude oil 1,130 km; petroleum products
630 km; natural gas 1,240 km
Ports and harbors: Baku (Baki)

Merchant marine:

total: 55 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 248,155
GRT/304,215 DWT

ships by type: cargo 12, petroleum tanker 40, roll-
on/roll-off 2, short-sea passenger 1 (1999 est.)

AZERBAIJAN - Major and Secondary Roads

updated by ReliefWeb: 7 . 6.96

MAP

o

under
sea navel

AZERBAIJAN CELL PHONE

COVERAGE

NGO ORGANIZATIONS IN

AZERBAIJAN

JFFtC Country- wide Activity |<5&|i3>|'

/ TT^ 7F — 1

isMiiiinr^a^E^

icab

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^ ECHpnSettlei
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echo 1

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Agcabedi lADRAl.M

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QiaOBESESIt]

□

lccT

ESI

sacrrnn

ADRA - Adventist Developmental Relief Agency

ARRA - Azeri Reconstructions and Relief to Areas

BIF - Benevolence International Foundation

DIAKONIE - German Evangelical Church

ECHO - European Community Humanitarian Organization

EU- TACIS - EU Reconstruction Office

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross

LCC - Leonard Cheshire Center

MSB-B - Medicine San Borders Belgium

WVI - World Vision International

UMID - Internally Displaced Persons

Piakonie|^*

WVlIMI [UNICEFl F5I [WFPl^
ACPI/VOCAl

imagn^i i

Earn emii

APFtAl^fWFPl^

rIT

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H

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i

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ECHCTSetttem

EU-TACISl

wirai i

MSm 1 3!Esaa

__OrdzHbnilddze

Goradtzy

^/CA

nuiiMl llPirjill I

AZERBAIJAN INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS

| over 100.000
| 50.001 - 100.000
| 40.001 - 50.000
| 30.001 - 40.000
Q 20.001 - 30.000

Q 10.001 - 20.000

Q 5.001 - 10.000
Q 1.001 - 5.000
Q till 1.000

1-58 N° District

Kura Araks Lowland

Yehakha'ia

haramar'y^n

lr»ba

'jladlif

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r pmkhrbhs-i

lsk4~Ld4Fti

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Xocavand

mmcze

Gyuseykaler

.^Kafchar , * Yukfial-^khanly >

Kura Araksinskaya Nizmennost
(Kura Araks Lowland)

Large depression between the
Caucasus and Malyy Kavkaz
(Little Caucasus) mountain ranges,
lincludes the Kura and Araks rivers.
The lowland has a dry, subtropical
climate and contains oil fields.

r ■■ ■ o
&

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kjonstant novka
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lineni Dvadtsst Shest Bal<dn?ki<h Komssa-o'/ ,

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Araks River - fast and unnaviga

Poor cover and concealment enroute
Combination of agricultural and industrial areas
Kura and Araks Rivers primary natural obstacles
Lowlands heavily irrigated.. numerous canals

Eastern Karabach Region

Mekhrably

- Q Agd

Potub

Sarykhanly

Mnakhoriu ‘V 11

^inazarii

Bim-iay

Shelli

Nerkin Myth bag
emishdzhan

Xocavand

Ordzhonikidze

uvat

Yukhari-j^J

Chalma Kane

Signakh

Ham^M^ndT 0
^ajjT Bala Beyglu

L y 3san ft*

Tsakuri

0 Unannovu

° Melikpeya

- \ m . . I

' l Muradkhanly

Shykhtyar
. Sofulu

himli

DTkdash

iisyly

tta^ly

Shakhvelli

National captd

Autonomous icfuiNic

and oblast (AOjrcontcr

Town

Main Road

Ra ad

Rairond

Airport

KTiinl.it

□ KhanIVk

■11 ; hi

KonakMurid 0

Shu rani

ShwnMt v N cajja

Geranboy ^Khanlar y (
r oLithlitosiin”^ 1 " 1

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* Slfnqajft 1

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ARMENIA r

jAgcfcm

Z-^v-A

tepwan

Boltagan

Lachirw

None h.ii.V"'

\AKir lll-ANyi

c\ iaj?t *

Mnm

ichivan ? Ghopait^

Agdam on slight plateau above Kura-Araks lowland
Xankandi (capital of Nagorno Karabach) 20 k SW of
Agdam

Little Caucasus Mountains begin immediately to
the West of Agdam

Irrigation systems less prevalent south of Agdam

UXO and Mjne Contamination Map

nd Defensive Minefie

m Area

Anfar

■ .vlv

.li

AGDAM DISTRICT

Territory 1154 sq.km
Population 58000
Villages and settlements
122

Dwelling houses 24446
Industrial companies 48
Schools 160
Health care centers 65
Cultural establishments 37

Mosques 3

(il

Agdam

Scene of ethnic cleansing by Anfari troops
Slowly rebuilding after 1993 war 15k to 20k pop
Numerous NGOs in area
Unmarked minefields throughout area

75% of the city is occupi

osqi

Mostly one - two story buildings
Several 5-8 story apartment buildings
Hard packed unimproved roads
Trees and undergrowth restrict LOS

Casualty Producing Terrain

SE of Agdam Terrain

AxMeAaB3ip s

324 0

r^ypa A^mh

.hOciHCtJA^aH/

X w

;• f^04^4Jibi

f^opKapH^ i

tUl Tonal c.ipld
’Aiuonmnij! icpuNic
and obtet (AOjconlv
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Main Read
Road
Ralroad
Alipoft

At! Ill

Shuns i

StanMr

^hanaMiy

,, u n

1.1 4 * .» | .1

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mi Cttel \ jJ
Kharlionill
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Bollagan

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NAKlICHlVdiN/l
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Upper Karabakh Ca

Numerous Irrigation can^
may restrict ground
movement

Uncultivated agricultural
fields

provide excellent fields
of fire from villages and
orchards

Pomegranates)

Orchards with heavy undergrowth restrict vehicle
maneuver and provide cover and concealment for

-Damalji ...

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D ~

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NAGORNO-KARABAKH INTERNAL LIBERATION

ORGANIZATION (NKILO)

0
■■•D

' I-, J

+^i

Bi
o

«

Composition :

* Former residents of Nagorno-Karabakh— now in AZ

■ Islamists playing on Shia sympathies— appealing to
the "downtrodden" and those who oppose the corrupt
AZ government

■ Exact numbers unknown— believed to be several
thousand

o

IflaK-v f^ 1 cZrt IT"

0 i, Sad a at

Valilar

a

X-a-B" '£? l -.“ —h

^ E^rda, ^Qtuzikilyar

.BaNi'kaya

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Kagiz

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jo ofii ^fcaziHKays

Ak^ay

Dalkl1 '^ Toprakkale
D

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mm?

^CTrydash

^ , Mokhrata

K.i.-.M 3 | 3

Xgdar^N 0 ® adzh #^
Sifydzhaly Melikli

it - .

Objectives :

• Overthrow of the "corrupt" AZ
government

B Supportive Government in BAKU
■ NK in hands of its rightful citizenry

io

Strategy :

pfc*

— I

, O

• Focus world attention on the NKILO
cause

■ Aggravate the ANFAR / AZ situation to
create world support for NKILO cause
B Support/oppose either ANFAR or AZ for
short-term political or military advantage

l "T MU 4:r :IUi /

W

© 1 988-1 999 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reservec

:^yukh

o

A

OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC
COMMANDS (OSC)

XXX XXX

XXX XXX XXX

See separate Line & Block chart for more detail

5 th OSC

2

1

CM

D

31

4

ING

Airfields and Landing Zones

Airfield
Landing Zone

■ "’I,

Gyandzha
tal C130,C17

Yevlakh

C130,C17

Dollyar

C130,C17

cmaz

Shuraabad

C130

usar*

Quba'

Sumgait

C130,C17,C5

Agstaf

Tovu

eptervotr

^Mingacevir
J Agdas

la Altiagac
3f*l_agich

W ■ mm

Samaxi

^Sarnk

?anca

Abseron

Pen.

Dashkesan

ARMENIA

IAGORNO-

ARABAKH

Pispyted)^.

\Agd an.
XankandL; r

Baku-Kala

C130,C17,C5

cabadi

rabad

Baku-Bina

C130,C17,C5

Sangachaly

C130,C17,C5

Sarur
NAXCIVAN
:erbaiiani ext

Bilasuvar

Caspian

Naxciva

Kara Chala
C130,C17,C5

Agdam

C130,C17

Lankar

Lankaran

C130,C17

Kurdamir

C130,C17,C5

Fuzuli/East

C130

Astara

Nakhichevan

C130,C17

x

ANFAR ANTI-ACCESS CAPABILITY

P

1 P 4
Bacau,<

MTA > r>V/

Donets’k

UKRAINE

Mykolayiv

Vofgqd&nsk

Mariupol

i

Melitopol''

Rostq

erson

REGIONAL

UAV

COVERAGE

GLOBAL SPF
COVERAGE

CASPIAN

KRASNODAR

Kropotkin

Kerch

Buch

k-na-Kubam

Krasni

Stavropol

DEPRESSION

BULGAF

Armavir

Maykop

Cherkessk

Tuapse

S-400 SAM
400 KM

khachkala

'Black Sea

adikav-kaz

Edirne

Urganch

Zonguldak^ s
Adapazari (

GEORGIA

Istanbu

msun

Bursa

Chorum

CRUISE
MISSILE
COVERAGE
TO 3000 KM

REPUBLIC OF
ANFAR

Tokat

Gumuj

Ankara

Kutahya

Afyon

Karakos^

Sivas

Erzurum a

TURKEY

Kayseri

Isparta

Diyarbakir

'anmara^

Adiyaman

Karaman

^.Rasht

Urmia

Crcre

amishll

iske^ideryn
\ .-.Halal

WEREWOLF
300 KM

Ar Raqqah

SPF

CYPRUS

Hamah

Dayr az Zawr

SYRIA

Hanhidan

Tripoli

tRAN

> Only 2 Major SPODs
Azerbaijan

> Only 2 Major APODs
feet... 1 in Georgia

V . — l%nnn milae hoaim

Kashan

UPIRTBM
1000 KM

Azerbaijan; 10,000

K E.. R MAN

...Kerman

^ ii 6

L M .. Ij.AaWf

o

Syubyutu Abda

zhafarabad\ Shirvanly

Sfrykhoba

Khanabad

lchyly^ Mir

Yeulaic

Vladimirovka

laceuir

^Otuzikilyar

Seidlya^

rtar°

- lW

^Agdar^.-
Sifydzhaly Melikli

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iakh

akhrnjj.^u

S hrdkyij rb Hyli^
u 1 1 a rriia g e rra m I i

i u j

■$h£ybey rt K'orad

Sofukf

gisj-gmalii

A^gitulg

) 1 988-1 999 Microsoft and/or it

All rights reservet

Pin arli

C a mTrftatak

Damlasu

£ayirba^i

Tuzluca

Sankami^ \

Ve^mu

i \

Kdtek

Kagizman^

°Ta ? b
■Vdlikir;

azikkaya

Ak^ay

akkale

.iglaksuyu

jTji ril * i

Dorukdibi

r. -. rr-. -. k

AN FAR FORCE COMBAT SYSTEMS

°P ig h_Js h by u r

Boz

Weapon

l

Armor

Chieftain t

Artillery

2S3, 2S9, 2S19

Rockets

BM-21, 9A52, 9P140 *

SAMs

0

Crotale, SA-13, Stinger i

\

Helicopters

Hind-F

£

IFV

•m

BMP-2, AMX-10, BRM ''

APC

BTR-80 i

Anti-Tank

MT-12, M40A1, Carl i

Gun / Msl

Gustaf T

1

TBM

AT- 5, AT-9, AT- 13 S

i

ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES

•Control access to the regl

a v<>»' jy

•Change the nature of the cofriyj£C

•Employ operational shielding.

•Control tempo.

•Neutralize technological
overmatch.

• Cause politically unacceptable
casualties.

Allow no sanctuary.

ANFAR SYSTEMOLOGY

Adaptive Tenets

Strategic Operations : Anfar uses 10 and special operations to deter
and/or limit outside involvement in the Anfar-Azeri conflict.

Exclusion : Anfar uses 10, IW, and special operations to preclude or
limit US/coalition establishment of logistic or C2 sites for operations
against Anfar.

Limiting : Anfar targets APOD/SPOD sites in Georgia and Azerbaijan
with long-range precision fires, special operations, and IW to deny or
disrupt the use of assets crucial for supporting US/coalition deployment
into the AOR.

Shielding : Anfar uses dispersion, deception, sophisticated ambushes,
as well as complex and urban terrain to neutralize US/coalition ISR and
long-range precision strikes.

Force Preservation : Anfar uses complex terrain, limited maneuver
and engineer operations to hide and disperse key equipment and C2
nodes. Extensive use of C5D2 to degrade US/coalition ISR and hamper
its long-range targeting effort.

Recon Fires : Anfar uses precision fires from dispersed locations to
attack key US C3, ISR, and logistic nodes.

^ ^ ■ I ^ C 4i»ti ■ A nf ^ r rfrl lx/> r I I C / /■' rv I I 4- 1 rv r> i a i U \ a i U>

ADAPTIVE APPLICATIONS

Anfar high value military
capabilities disperse and "hug"
refugee camps, international
organizations, mosques,
hospitals . . .

Infantry and
Engineers establish
defenses in complex
terrain

Mechanized / Armored units,
supported by artillery and
rockets, transition from rapid
offensive operations to
dynamic, multi-dimensional

APPLICATIONS

GPS and electronic
jammers are employed
to shield forces

Azeri insurgents & dissidents
- leveraged, trained, and
prepared to conduct direct

Local citizens /reservists
are organized and trained
to report enemy troop
movements and
dispositions

APPLICATIONS

Special Purpose Forces target
and take direct action against
reserves, communications, LOCs,
airfields . . . and other high
payoff targets

Long Range - High Altitude
sophisticated Air Defense
systems are dispersed and
hidden throughout Anfar and
Nagorno-Karabakh

Mobile TBMs and Cruise
Missiles postured to be
prepared to strike critical
targets

^OVAiqA

SaRjot^rjan

HUNGARY

©

Pecs

Oradea^

-^Osijek "V y '

©

Cluj-Napoca

■j Timisoara

' ROMANIA
Belnrade

Baca

NKILO in
contact with
Azeri forces

2 /'ja

.-Skei

Sevf

1

NKILO incursion
into Nagorno-
Karabakh
against Anfar

Anfar begins
IO campaign

Mariup

©

Melitop
hankoy

eropol 1

1 ROSTOV .

Dptfets’k ^Vblgoflbnsk

KAZAKHSTAN

Iranian Forces, w /
Anfar Bde massing
on the Azeri Border
for annual exercise

KraST

lunar

'alta

©■■..
Maykop..

Cherkessk

J

1 July 2001

BULGARIA

nl " |]liV

0

Varn

15 Aug

am—

i

i J - KirWareli

* © h

J Edirne

I

Sochi

essaloniki ■

.-.\r

Azeri Govt warns
the international
community (UN)
that it is unable to
control internal
situation.

SE

Martin

0

n _ j:

Sinop

Azeri's

capture Anfar
SPF in
support of
the

insumpnt-*;.

Oct 2001

] -D AGES T AH

FDO - Reorient ISR

1 C

FDO - SAG and

assets into the

MEU/MPSRON to

Caspian Region

0

Black Sea

il'i Iim LI "'i 1 — ' V

20 Oct
I 2001

huo - move

m u ? ak

©

ugla

©
Denizli

Burdur
Antalya

Nev^
Konya

Y

FDO - Intensify PSYOP in the

area.

i - du - Lvt5u to rne tasrern me a

hi

briz

neh_

©

Men

©

Iraklion

FDO - SOF increases OPTEMPO
of CINC TEP

iliTETEreil

_a

JTjar

| FDO - CMO conducting area/site

Lemesos

LEI . ,

surveys for HNS.

0

Sa

©
abjah

Kj

liarn

LIBYA

I

EGYPT

FDO - Log Exercise in the Black Sea

I 5 J.J. I

A

\

y

Air Def, AEF
and ISR
platforms to

USNCA

activates CJTF

Position SOF
Coalition
Support Teams
with Azeri

Alexandria

isfAI

Jer

FDO - APS from Diego Garcia to
Black Sea

Theater &
Corps
Enablers

given

1 A# A D MADH

SaRjot^rjan

HUNGARY

UULIjUIjKMU

o

Pecs

Oradea^j

Road To War

KAZAKHSTAN

. .

- ■ ^sijek V

- 3 ^Timi^oara

Bacau

0 -

Anfar attacks
with OSCs in the
North and South
to seize Baku
oilfields

srin

©

©

JO ■,

1 Nov
2001

*

Jiv

Anfari forces
reach initial
objectives and
assume
defensive
positions due to
air campaign.

J Edirne

Azeri Govt
requests
international
miltary

assistance.
UKbbUb

I

2001

iupol'

®

itopol 1

i

tstovna-Donu ..

KAI MVKIA t

Agtxfllrhfln 1

RUSSIA

Terrorist attacks
against
SPODs/LOCs

Istanbu

Bartin

3 Nov

20001
— uj rortes

0

0

Bafra

mm

* ■ ' - -

OSCs begin
operations
against US
forces

20 Dec

2001 y

a -0

"\ ...

'- 1 - 1 1 V V

\

,1

I.

i ■ -^Vladikavkaz

jIA ""

* t

begin

Air/SPF

Attacks

Zonguldak

^ankiri 0

ara

0 ^Samsun

0 1 0
gorum ordu —

30 Dec
2001

}

1 Jan 2002

3

imri'

T

s' 61

U -Kirikkale jokat

0

Kir^ehir

Sivas

Cayseri

Tunce

i\

US Forces
given OPORD

H 0

J(onya TURKEY .

Kahramanmara^Q aiiyar

Gaziante

CJTF 1
deploys V
Corps, 1AD,
101 ABN,
MEF into
Azerbaijan

1 V < •

1AD and 101 st
ABN occupy
TAAs

:

9 TURKME

w

0 ■: . -

- 1 a? ,

<hvoy ' "■ .

^Tabriz ^r^abll
Mianeh_ ^Rashft

T L >

Chalus

Gonbad-e Gat?d

LIBYA

Mersin ^Adana ^

-LManbii."

Antakya Q @ 0

Al LadhiqTyah v ' ' yalab As Sulayman^ah Q v " Sanandaj

0 _ Davr az Zawr S © Hamadan Jtom

r

„ Mosul

® Sei^jaq

CYPRUS

SYRIA

, 0 _

Lemesos ^ -Jr

LEBANON ° Tri ^ 0|i

Beirut [^Damascus

_ j __

Haifa^ r As

ISRAEL ■ "

Ipru^alpm 1 r*-i JORDAN
Alexandria Jeru!a 5f® Vman, ■ - " '

^Dayr az Zawr

-i- b © _ ®

=l "" u Amol

0

Zanjan K araj Q ^ Tehr a n

I

m f

ujalabjah ©

KhanaqTnj"^ ..Kermanshah

Mandali -

Baghdad,.. - 0

IRAQ E

llam

IRAN

©

Khorramabad

gE^fahan

v

Karbala'® Majaf

W Al'Amarah f @ Ahvaz

_Dezful 0
w x_\\ Tzeh Shahr-e Kord
\ 0

Rustavi

i. ^

Vanadzor

Fragate
Lerr 4090 m
(13,419 ft)

ereva

Hoktei

WPI

Mount AVar
5137 m J
(16,354 ft) 'i

Xankandi

Dogubayazrt

O Nakhichivan

1 988-1 999 Microsoft and/or it

All rights reserved

ANFAR 5th OSC has seized
objectives vicinity of
Agdam. Attack stopped
along D+5 line of advance
due to JTF airstrikes and
international pressure.
Postured in the defense
to retain oilfields.

Garasu

Assessment

ANFAR attacks to seize initial objectives

hashuri

lyazan

anadzor

Lerr 4090 m
(13,419 ft)

Yerevan

ARMENIA

Lie h

Hoktei

Qarasu

eryan

Jj 'Karabakh

» i. —

Agdam

[(disputed)

Mount A'rar;
5137 m J
(16,354 ft] ^

Xankandi

Salyan

Dogubayazrt

karan

© 1 988-1 999 Microsoft and/or its suppliers. All rights reserved

Dispositions (Jan 02)

Nax^ivaft

Khucy

TJiiinrtnAi

REPUBLIC OF ANFAR ANNOUNCED

END STATE

KAZAKHS

KismuoasK

KtAi an "L I)

Aqtai

J 1 ~ L I Tj"! IIM F Jl

■ Internationally recognized political control of
NK

■ Share in the economic benefits of the BTC
pipleline

■ Retribution for Turkish / Azeri genocide

■ Strengthen Iranian partnership

■ Access to Black Sea ports through the Baku-
T‘

u J um M©

Ka - ■

0

jrikam

REPUBLIC OF
ANFAR

Karakose Doguba^

Patnos

Anfar

Genocide

Ahar

Wan

Khasawurt

Vladikavkaz

Ts'khinyali

AGESTAN

Artvin

XaqRSndi

Karakofcan

Nax^iva

Khucy

ui c i |i_-i i c n.

OPFOR Assessment
Of BLUFOR COAs

)POL

ieorgiyevsk

KAZAKHS

Kizlya

Hal’chik. '■■■

vodsk

Aqtai

Pchik ^

w \ : Groznyy n

Tyrnyauz. ■ •. ©

Makhachkala

Derbent

f .K’ut’aisi _

SamtruliahiL esaam

Bat’umi

* Re-establish Azeri control of NK

* Regain territory lost to Anfar

> Control resources, ensure
continued access to Caspian oil

* Force Anfar forces back within
recognized borders

‘Limit BLUFOR casualties

Erzincan

Erzuri f^^ , A^‘--

Karakose

Hims

Patnos

□

Wan

■\,Siyazan

'3J

Ahar

Salyan

Baku H ki .
IBAIJAN

/

Lankaran